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Abstract— Maintaining the security of control systems in
the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In
literature, several possible attacks against control systems have
been formulated including replay, false data injection, and zero
dynamics attacks. The detection and prevention of these attacks
may require the defender to possess a particular subset of
trusted communication channels. Alternatively, these attacks
can be prevented by keeping the system model secret from
the adversary. In this paper, we consider an adversary who
has the ability to modify and read all sensor and actuator
channels. To thwart this adversary, we introduce external states
dependent on the state of the control system, with linear time-
varying dynamics unknown to the adversary. We also include
sensors to measure these states. The presence of unknown time-
varying dynamics is leveraged to detect an adversary who
simultaneously aims to identify the system and inject stealthy
outputs. Potential attack strategies and bounds on the attacker’s
performance are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical systems (CPSs), referring to the tight
interconnection of sensing, communication, and control in
physical spaces, are becoming widespread in today’s soci-
ety. Indeed, these systems will serve a significant role in
several applications including transportation, water distri-
bution, medical technologies, manufacturing, and of course
the smart grid. Due to the proliferation of CPSs in critical
infrastructures, their safety and security are of paramount
importance. There have already been several powerful attacks
against CPSs. One major example is Stuxnet, which targeted
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems at uranium enrichment facilities in Iran [1], [2]. Here,
the adversary was able to appropriate controllers running
centrifuges at the plant, and avoid detection by replaying
previous measurements to the system operator. An additional
example is the Maroochy Shire incident where a disgruntled
employee performed an attack on a SCADA based sewage
control system [3].
Previous work [4] has suggested that existing tools in
cyber security are insufficient to address attacks on CPSs
due to the underlying physical system. Two main classes of
attacks defined by [4] are denial of service attacks where an
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attacker restricts the flow of information between the plant
and control center, and integrity attacks where an adversary
can alter control inputs and sensor outputs. An intelligent
adversary can potentially cause physical damage to a system
using access to control inputs while manipulating sensor
measurements to avoid detection. As such, integrity attacks
are the main focus of this paper.
Several integrity attacks have been investigated in the
literature. For instance, [5], [6] analyze zero dynamics attacks
where an adversary injects inputs into both the actuators
and sensors so as to bias the state without inserting a net
bias on the sensor measurements. False data injection attacks
on measurements, where an adversary alters a subset of
sensor measurements to induce destabilizing control inputs
from the defender have also been studied. Liu et. al. [7]
first studied false data injection attacks in the context of
electricity grids. Furthermore, in [8], the authors consider
false data injection in control systems, providing sufficient
and necessary conditions for an attacker to destabilize a
system while introducing a bounded bias on measurement
residues. Finally, replay attacks where an adversary repeats
a sequence of past measurements are analyzed in [9], [10].
The detection and prevention of integrity attacks on control
systems against adversaries who are aware of the system
model rely on the presence of one or more secure commu-
nication channels between the operator and the plant. For
instance, [6] provides sufficient and necessary conditions for
zero dynamics attacks based on the actuators and sensors
in possession of the adversary. If the adversary has access
to all sensors and actuators, a trivial zero dynamics attack
is to subtract ones influence from the true measurements.
To prevent false data injection attacks in control systems, a
particular subset of measurements must be secure from the
adversary [8]. Moreover, [11] proposes assigning security
indices to each sensor to quantify the effort required for an
adversary to introduce a successful false data injection attack.
Physical watermarking, used to detect replay attacks in [9],
[10] and robust attacks defined in [12], relies on the ability to
inject secret noisy inputs into the control system. Also, [13]
which considers the problem of robust estimation and control
in the presence of integrity attacks, relies on the assumption
that the attacker is only able to manipulate less than half the
sensors.
In this paper, we consider the scenario where an adversary
has access to all communication channels. Thus, to prevent
an attack, an adversary must not be aware of the full
system model. [14] considers the problem of altering system
matrices to avoid zero dynamics attacks. However, in practice
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an adversary can use his access to both inputs and outputs
to identify the system. Moreover, a malicious insider such as
the attacker in the Maroochy Shire incident might be aware
of the system model. Consequently, we propose introducing
extraneous states correlated to the ordinary states of the
system so that modification of the original states will impact
the extraneous states. The extraneous states will have linear
time-varying dynamics, known to the system operator and
hidden from the adversary. The dynamics act as a moving
target, changing fast enough so the adversary does not have
adequate opportunity to identify the extraneous system. In
this scenario, we propose attacks for the adversary and obtain
detection bounds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce our system model and control strategy.
In Section III, we propose the moving target approach to
detect integrity attacks on control systems. In Section IV, we
summarize the attacker’s capabilities and propose two attack
models. In Section V, we analyze bounds on the attacker’s
performance. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the model for our system.
In particular, we assume our cyber-physical system can be
modeled as a discrete time control system where
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk, (1)
yk = Cxk + vk. (2)
Here xk ∈ Rn is the state vector at time k and uk ∈ Rp
is a collection of control inputs. A suite of sensors are used
to monitor the state. Here yk ∈ Rm is a vector of sensor
measurements taken at time k. wk is the independent and
identically distributed (IID) process noise with probability
distribution given by N (0, Q) where Q  0. Meanwhile,
vk is the IID measurement noise with distribution given by
vk ∼ N (0, R) where R  0. We assume that (A,C) is
detectable. Additionally, (A,B) and (A,Q
1
2 ) are assumed
to be stabilizable.
The set of measurements yk are sent to the SCADA
center in order to compute the optimal control input. For our
purposes, we assume that the operator wishes to minimize a
quadratic function of the states and inputs as follows
J = lim
T→∞
1
T + 1
E
[
T∑
k=0
xTkWxk + u
T
k Uuk
]
, (3)
where W ∈ Rn×n, U ∈ Rp×p are positive definite matrices
defining the relative cost of each state and input. The optimal
control input for the given cost function is a combination of
a Kalman filter and a linear state feedback controller [15].
The Kalman filter computes the minimum mean squared
error state estimate xˆrk|k
1 given the previous set of measure-
ments up to yk denoted by y1:k. We assume that the system
1The superscript r is used to distinguish the ordinary state estimate from
the state estimate obtained through the moving target model.
has been running for a long time so that the Kalman filter
has converged to a fixed gain linear estimator.
xˆrk+1|k = Axˆ
r
k|k +Buk, (4)
xˆrk|k = (I −KC)xˆrk|k−1 +Kyk, (5)
K = PCT (CPCT +R)−1, (6)
P = APAT +Q−APCT (CPCT +R)−1CPAT . (7)
The optimal control input with respect to (3) is given by
u∗k = Lxˆ
r
k|k, L = −(BTSB + U)−1BTSA, (8)
and S satisfies the following Riccati equation
S = ATSA+W −ATSB(BTSB + U)−1BTSA. (9)
A bad data detector can be utilized to determine whether a
malicious attack is occurring. Typically, the bad data detector
can be written as a threshold-based detector where
gk(Ik)
H1
≷
H0
ηk. (10)
Here, Ik is the information available to the defender. The
null hypothesis H0 is that the system is operating normally
while the alternate hypothesis H1 is that the system is under
attack. A more specific detector will be discussed later in the
article. We furthermore define the probability of detection βk
and false alarm α as
βk = Pr (gk (Ik) > ηk|H1) , α = Pr (gk (Ik) > ηk|H0) .
(11)
Observe that α is independent of k since the system is
stationary under H0. Regardless of the information available
to a system operator, an attacker with knowledge of the input
to output model as well as the ability to manipulate sensor
measurements and control inputs, can generate undetectable
attacks [16].
For instance, an adversary can simply subtract the influ-
ence he inserts through the control inputs from the system
outputs as follows
xk+1 = Axk +B(u
∗
k + u
a
k) + wk, (12)
yk = Cxk + vk + s
a
k, (13)
where sak is given by
xak+1 = Ax
a
k +Bu
a
k, (14)
sak = −Cxak. (15)
In this case, the attack has zero net effect on the outputs and
as a result βk = α.
III. THE MOVING TARGET
As discussed in the previous section, an adversary who
is both aware of the system model and has access to all
channels can generate undetectable attacks. In this work, we
propose introducing linear time-varying dynamics, unknown
to the adversary, but known to the defender, into the system.
The defender can leverage his knowledge of the system
to detect integrity attacks by the adversary. Moreover, by
introducing time-varying dynamics, the defender limits the
adversary’s ability to identify the system using his access to
measurements and inputs. The time-varying dynamics act as
a moving target.
A. Extended Model
We extend the state xk to include extraneous states x˜k ∈
Rn˜ as follows[
x˜k+1
xk+1
]
= Ak
[
x˜k
xk
]
+ Bkuk +
[
w˜k
wk
]
, (16)
where
Ak ,
[
A1,k A2,k
0 A
]
, Bk ,
[
Bk
B
]
. (17)
Moreover, we introduce additional sensors y˜k ∈ Rm˜ to
measure the extraneous states.[
y˜k
yk
]
= Ck
[
x˜k
xk
]
+
[
v˜k
vk
]
, Ck ,
[
Ck 0
0 C
]
. (18)
The matrices are assumed to be IID random variables which
are independent of the sensor and process noise with distri-
bution
A1,k, A2,k, Bk, Ck+1 ∼ fA1,k,A2,k,Bk,Ck+1(A1, A2, B, C).
(19)
Furthermore, we also assume that[
w˜k
wk
]
∼ N (0,Q) ,
[
v˜k
vk
]
∼ N (0,R) , (20)
where
Q =
[
Q˜ Q˜12
Q˜T12 Q
]
 0, R =
[
R˜ R˜12
R˜T12 R
]
 0. (21)
Remark 1: While we assume the structure of the system
introduced above with IID matrices A1,k, A2,k, Bk, Ck+1,
the moving target design can still be effective in other
scenarios. For instance, the dynamics need not be linear
as long as the defender can accurately model the system.
Moreover, the system parameters do not have to evolve at
each time step, though the longer the target remains in place,
the easier it is for the adversary to identify the system. In
addition, the matrices A1,k, A2,k, or Bk may be sparse, as
long as there exists adequate coupling between xk and x˜k.
Remark 2: The defender must be able to introduce ex-
traneous states with time-varying dynamics correlated to
the original state of the system. The extraneous states are
application dependent and are to be decided by the system
operator. Nonetheless, the system operator can leverage
existing waste products of the system, for instance the heat
dissipated by a reaction or process. The dynamics can be
made time-varying by changing conditions at the plant.
Alternatively, the defender can introduce dynamics into the
system. For instance, the defender can introduce RLC circuits
which measure the states. Time varying dynamics can be
incorporated by including variable resistors or capacitors. By
varying the components of the circuit according to some IID
distribution at each time step, the defender can generate IID
system matrices.
Remark 3: In the above formulation we assume that the
defender is aware of the real time system matrices although
they are random. In general, this information should not
be sent over the network since doing so amounts to the
existence of a secure communication channel. The secure
communication channel could be leveraged to detect an
attack without considering a moving target approach, for
instance through physical watermarking [12]. Alternatively,
we can generate pseudo random system matrices using a
pseudo random number generator (PRNG). In this case, the
seed of the PRNG will be known to the defender and kept
hidden from the attacker.
B. Estimation and Detection
The presence of additional sensors allows us to improve
our estimate of the state. In particular, we can incorporate
an additional Kalman filter to estimate the state as follows.[
ˆ˜xk+1|k
xˆk+1|k
]
= Ak
(
(I −KkCk)
[
ˆ˜xk|k−1
xˆk|k−1
]
+Kk
[
y˜k
yk
])
+ BkLxˆrk|k, (22)
Kk = PkCTk
(CkPkCTk +R)−1 , (23)
Pk+1 = Ak (Pk −KkCkPk)ATk +Q. (24)
Observe that we use the state estimate xˆrk|k to compute the
input u∗k as opposed to an estimate derived from (22). We
assume the defender does not care about controlling x˜k. In
this case, adding the moving target does not change J . Such
a strategy also prevents the attacker from using information
from the input to learn about the system model. In fact, we
have the following result.
Theorem 1: The input u∗k = Lxˆ
r
k|k is independent from
the system matrices A1,k−1, A2,k−1, Bk−1, Ck for all k.
Proof: The input u∗k is given by
l(xˆr0|0, x0, A,B,C,K,L,w0 . . . wk−1, v1 . . . vk), (25)
where l is some deterministic function of variables which by
assumption are independent from A1,k−1, A2,k−1, Bk−1, Ck
for all k. The result immediately follows.
A similar result can be obtained under attack where
u∗k is conditionally independent of the system matrices
A1,k−1, A2,k−1, Bk−1, Ck for all k, given the adversary’s
attack inputs.
We assume that a residue based detector is incorporated
where the residue zk is given by
zk ,
[
y˜k
yk
]
− Ck
[
ˆ˜xk|k−1
xˆk|k−1
]
∼ N (0, CkPkCTk +R) . (26)
We can leverage knowledge of the distribution of zk under
normal operation to design a detector. In particular we
consider a χ2 detector where gk in (10) is given by
gk(zk) = z
T
k (P¯k)−1zk, (27)
where P¯k = CkPkCk + R. Under normal operation gk has
a χ2 distribution. In general, the window for the detector
can be extended to consider past measurements. In Figure 1,
we include a diagram of the moving target system operating
normally.
Fig. 1. Diagram of system under normal operation
IV. ATTACK MODEL
In this section we describe a near omnipotent attacker
in terms of his capabilities, access to information, and
potential strategies. On one hand, the adversary may acquire
his knowledge and resources through a highly sophisticated
attack strategy as done in Stuxnet. On the other hand, an ad-
versary can obtain his resources through insider information
and access as done in the Maroochy Shire incident.
A. Attack Capabilities
1) The attacker can insert arbitrary inputs into the system
and can arbitrarily alter the sensor measurements. As a result,
when under attack, the system has dynamics given by[
x˜k+1
xk+1
]
= Ak
[
x˜k
xk
]
+ Bk(uk + uak) +
[
w˜k
wk
]
, (28)[
y˜ak
yak
]
=
[
y˜k
yk
]
+
[
s˜ak
sak
]
. (29)
where uak is the attacker’s control input and s˜
a
k and s
a
k are
the biases injected on the extraneous sensors and ordinary
sensors respectively.
2) The attacker can read the true outputs of the system
y˜k, yk and the inputs being sent by the defender to the plant
uk for all time k.
Remark 4: The attacker essentially performs a man in the
middle attack between the plant and system operator so that
he can manipulate and read all communication channels
arbitrarily. A malicious insider can do this by breaking
encryption schemes. Furthermore, physical attacks can be
used to change sensor measurements and control inputs. For
instance, locally heating or cooling a temperature sensor
would change the sensor measurements without violating the
integrity or authenticity of data from a cyber perspective.
3) The attacker has full knowledge of the system model
S , {A,B,C,K,L,Q,R}. Moreover, the adversary knows
the probability density function (pdf) of random matrices
A1,k, A2,k, Bk, Ck+1.
Remark 5: While conservative, the adversary can obtain
his knowledge of the system model by observing the com-
munication channels for an extended period of time and
performing system identification. Moreover, observe that
since the attacker is aware of the original system model and
all outputs, he can asymptotically predict the state estimate
xˆrk|k if the matrix (A+BL)(I −KC) is stable [9].
Remark 6: The attacker can leverage his probabilistic
knowledge of the system model as well as the true outputs of
the system to generate stealthy attack inputs sak, s˜
a
k. In par-
ticular, the adversary can attempt to simultaneously identify
the moving target and generate convincing counterfeit sensor
outputs.
Based on the above definitions we can define the private
information available to the attacker and defender at time k
IAk , IDk and the public information IPk available to both as
IAk , {y˜j , yj , s˜aj−1, saj−1, uaj−1} ∀ j ≤ k, (30)
IDk , {A1,j−1, A2,j−1, Bj−1, Cj} ∀ j, (31)
IPk , {S, f(A1, A2, B,C), uj−1, y˜aj−1, yaj−1} ∀ j ≤ k.
(32)
In Figure 2, we include a diagram of the system under attack.
Fig. 2. Diagram of system under attack
B. Attack Strategy
In this subsection we propose two main attack strategies.
Without loss of generality we assume any attack begins at
k = 0.
1) Attack 1: Subtract Influence: In the first attack strategy
the attacker aims to estimate his influence on the control
system and subtract it. Define s¯ak , [s˜a Tk sa Tk ]T . Observe
that if
x¯ak+1 = Akx¯ak + Bkuak, ∆y¯ak = Ckx¯ak, (33)
with initial state x¯a0 = 0 and s¯
a
k = −∆y¯ak , an attack is
completely stealthy. As the adversary does not know the
time varying matrices, we assume he computes an estimate
of ∆y¯ak and uses that to subtract his influence on the sensor
measurements. Thus, we would have
s¯ak = −E[∆y¯ak |IAk ∪ IPk ]. (34)
Remark 7: Observe that the adversary can exactly subtract
his influence from measurements yk due to his knowledge of
the system model. However, the adversary should be unable
to completely subtract his bias from the extraneous sensors
y˜k.
Optimal Theoretical Estimation Define y¯ak ,
[y˜aTk y
aT
k ]
T , x¯k , [x˜Tk xTk ]T , w¯k , [w˜Tk wTk ]T ,
v¯k , [v˜Tk vTk ]T , and y¯k , [y˜Tk yTk ]T . The adversary’s
observations can be formulated through the following linear
time-varying system,[
x¯k+1
x¯ak+1
]
=
[Ak 0
0 Ak
] [
x¯k
x¯ak
]
+
[Bk Bk
0 Bk
] [
uk
uak
]
+
[
w¯k
0
]
,
(35)
y¯k =
[Ck 0] [x¯kx¯ak
]
+ v¯k. (36)
To estimate ∆y¯ak at time k, assume the adversary has ac-
cess to the following distribution f(x¯k, x¯ak, Ck|IA∪Pk ) where
IA∪Pk = IAk ∪ IPk Then we have
s¯ak = −
∫
x¯k
∫
x¯ak
∫
Ck
Ckx¯akf(x¯k, x¯ak, Ck|IA∪Pk )dx¯kdx¯akdCk.
(37)
We show that the pdf can be recursively computed at each
step. Letting ζk+1 = {x¯k+1, x¯ak+1, Ck+1} we have
f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk+1 ) = f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk , y¯ak , y¯k+1, s¯ak, uak, uk),
= f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk , y¯k+1, uak, uk),
=
f(y¯k+1|IA∪Pk , ζk+1)f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk , uk, uak)
f(y¯k+1|IA∪Pk , uk, uak)
.
(38)
The second equality follows from the conditional indepen-
dence of ζk+1 and y¯ak , s¯
a
k given y¯k and uk. The last equality
follows from Bayes rule and the conditional independence of
y¯k+1 and uk, uak given ζk+1. We note that this distribution
can be theoretically computed given the attacker’s informa-
tion. That is, we know that
f(y¯k+1|IA∪Pk , ζk+1) ∼ N (Ck+1x¯k+1,R) . (39)
Moreover, ζk+1 and y¯k+1 are deterministic functions of
ζk, uk, uak and random variables A1,k, A2,k, Bk, Ck+1,
w¯k, v¯k+1 which are independent of ζk given IA∪Pk . Thus,
theoretically, f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk+1 ) can be recursively computed
from f(ζk|IA∪Pk ).
Remark 8: If the attacker subtracts his influence, he might
be susceptible to a growing cancellation error if he attempts
to excite the system’s unstable dynamics. Instead of subtract-
ing his influence the attacker can instead directly estimate
what the defender expects to see as summarized in the next
section.
2) Attack 2: Estimate Expected Measurement: In the next
strategy, the adversary aims to track the system operator’s
state estimate. Using the system operator’s state estimate, the
adversary attempts to generate stealthy outputs. Let ˆ¯xk =
[ˆ˜xTk|k−1xˆ
T
k|k−1]
T . The attacker’s observations and strategy
can be formulated as follows[
x¯k+1
ˆ¯xk+1
]
=
[Ak 0
0 Ak(I −KkCk)
] [
x¯k
ˆ¯xk
]
+
[
w¯k
0
]
,
+
[Bk Bk 0
Bk 0 AkKk
]ukuak
y¯ak
 , (40)
y¯k =
[Ck 0] [x¯kˆ¯xk
]
+ v¯k, s¯
a
k = E[Ck ˆ¯xk|IA∪Pk ]− y¯k. (41)
The attacker wishes to track ζk = {x¯k, ˆ¯xk, Ck,Pk}. The use
of the preceding attack design is motivated by the ensuing
result which states that the chosen attack vector minimizes
a fixed quadratic function of the measurement residues.
Theorem 2: Let Σ  0 be a positive semidefinite matrix.
E[Ck ˆ¯xk|IA∪Pk ]− y¯k = arg min
s¯ak
E[zTk Σzk|IA∪Pk ]. (42)
Proof: Observe that
E[zTk Σzk|IA∪Pk ] =
∫
ζk
zTk Σzkf(ζk|IA∪Pk )dζk. (43)
Taking the gradient with respect to s¯ak and setting the
resulting expression equal to 0, we obtain∫
ζk
Σ(y¯k + s¯
a
k − Ck ˆ¯xk)f(ζk|IA∪Pk )dζk = 0. (44)
Solving gives
s¯ak = −y¯k +
∫
ζk
Ck ˆ¯xkf(ζk|IA∪Pk )dζk, (45)
and the result holds.
To determine s¯ak at time k assume the adversary has
access to the following distribution f(ζk|IA∪Pk ). As done
before, the attacker can theoretically compute s¯ak by taking
a conditional expectation. Additionally, similar to (38) we
have
f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk+1 )
=
f(y¯k+1|IA∪Pk , ζk+1)f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk , uk, uak, y¯ak)
f(y¯k+1|IA∪Pk , uk, uak, y¯ak)
. (46)
Moreover, by similar analysis as in attack 1, we can
demonstrate that f(ζk+1|IA∪Pk+1 ) can be recursively computed
from f(ζk|IA∪Pk ). The main difference here is that the
adversary must also estimate Pk. Note that in practice the
proposed attacks are difficult to execute for an adversary
since it is likely a challenge to compute the necessary distri-
bution functions and expected values. As a result, in the next
section we aim to provide bounds on the attacker’s estimation
performance in terms of mean square error matrices.
V. BOUNDS ON ATTACKER’S PERFORMANCE
A. Bounds on Attacker’s State Estimation
In this section we attempt to characterize lower bounds
on the error matrices associated with the states ζk defined
in attack strategy 1 and 2. From there, we can attempt to
characterize how well the adversary can design s¯ak to fool
the bad data detector.
We leverage conditional posterior Cramer-Rao lower
bounds for Bayesian sequences derived by [17]. The authors
here make use of the Bayesian Cramer-Rao lower bound
or Van Trees bound derived in [18] which states that for
observations y and states ζ the mean squared error matrix is
bounded by the Fisher information as follows
Ef(ζ,y)
[
[ζˆ(y)− ζ][ζˆ(y)− ζ]T
]
≥ I−1, (47)
where the Fisher information matrix I is given by
I = Ef(ζ,y)
[
−4ζζ logf(ζ, y)
]
. (48)
Note that
4yxg(x, y) , OxOTy g(x, y).
In [17], this result is extended to nonlinear Bayesian se-
quences with dynamics given by
ζk+1 = Fk(ζk, ωk), y¯k = Gk(ζk, v¯k), (49)
where ωk and v¯k are independent process and sensor noise
respectively. In our case, we slightly adapt these results to
account for the fact there is feedback in our system so that
ζk+1 = Fk(ζk, y¯1:k, ωk), y¯k = Gk(ζk, v¯k). (50)
The inputs uk, uak and s¯
a
k are incorporated into the definition
of Fk, while uncertainty in the model (A1,k, A2,k, Bk, Ck+1)
can be incorporated in the process noise ωk. It can shown
that the following posterior Cramer-Rao lower bound holds
Efck+1
[
e0:k+1e
T
0:k+1|y¯1:k
] ≥ I−1(ζ0:k+1|y¯1:k), (51)
where
e0:k+1 , ζ0:k+1 − ζˆ0:k+1(y¯k+1|y¯1:k), (52)
f ck+1 , f(ζ0:k+1, y¯k+1|y¯1:k), (53)
I(ζ0:k+1|y¯1:k) , Efck+1
[
−4ζ0:k+1ζ0:k+1 log f ck+1|y¯1:k
]
. (54)
Remark 9: We remark that since Fk is defined by in-
puts uk, uak and s¯
a
k, f
c
k+1 is implicitly conditioned on
u0:k, s¯
a
1:k, u
a
0:k. Moreover, f
c
k+1 is defined given the adver-
sary’s knowledge of S, f(A1, A2, B,C).
Observe that (51) gives us an expected lower bound for the
error matrix associated with the entire state history ζ0:k+1
with knowledge of measurements y¯1:k. This expectation is
taken over the state history as well the measurement y¯k+1 so
that ζˆ0:k+1 is a function of the measurement y¯k+1. Observe
that unlike the traditional Cramer-Rao bound which is limited
to unbiased estimators, the Bayesian Cramer-Rao bound here
considers both biased and unbiased estimators ζˆ.
While the lower bound given here applies to the entire
state history ζ0:k+1, in practice we care about estimating a
lower bound on the current state ζk+1. Nonetheless, it can
be easily shown that
Efck+1
[
ek+1e
T
k+1|y¯1:k
] ≥ I−1(ζk+1|y¯1:k), (55)
where I−1(ζk+1|y¯1:k) is the dim(ζk) × dim(ζk) lower
right submatrix of I−1(ζ0:k+1|y¯1:k). In practice, computing
I−1(ζk+1|y¯1:k) from I−1(ζ0:k+1|y¯1:k) is impractical since
it requires computing and taking the inverse of a Fisher
information matrix which grows in dimension at each time
step. As a result, we would like a recursion to compute
I−1(ζk+1|y¯1:k). From [17] we have the following result,
I(ζk+1|y¯1:k) = D22k −D21k
[
D11k + IA(ζk|y¯1:k)
]−1
D12k ,
(56)
where
D11k = Efck+1
[
−4ζkζk log f(ζk+1|ζk, y¯1:k)
]
,
D12k = Efck+1
[
−4ζk+1ζk log f(ζk+1|ζk, y¯1:k)
]
= (D21k )
T ,
D22k = Efck+1
[
−4ζk+1ζk+1 log f(ζk+1|ζk, y¯1:k)f(y¯k+1|ζk+1)
]
.
In addition,
IA(ζk|y¯1:k) = E22k − E21k
(
E11k
)−1
E12k , (57)
where
E11k = Ef(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
[
−4ζ0:k−1ζ0:k−1 log f(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
]
,
E12k = Ef(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
[
−4ζkζ0:k−1 log f(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
]
= (E21k )
T ,
E22k = Ef(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
[
−4ζkζk log f(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
]
.
We observe that it is still difficult to obtain matrices
E11k , E
12
k , E
21
k , E
22
k so [17] introduces the following approx-
imate recursion
IA(ζk|y¯1:k) ≈ S22k −S12 Tk
[
S11k + IA(ζk−1|y¯1:k−1)
]−1
S12k ,
(58)
where
S11k = Ef(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
[
−4ζk−1ζk−1 log f(ζk|ζk−1, y¯1:k−1)
]
,
S12k = Ef(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
[
−4ζkζk−1 log f(ζk|ζk−1, y¯1:k−1)
]
,
S22k = Ef(ζ0:k|y¯1:k)
[
−4ζkζk log f(ζk|ζk−1, y¯1:k−1)f(y¯k|ζk)
]
.
We observe that in practice it may still be difficult to
compute the exact expectations because high dimensional
integration is generally involved. Nonetheless, particle filters
as described in [19] can be used to approximate these
expectations. Alternative approximations for the conditional
posterior Cramer-Rao lower bound can be found in [20].
Unconditional bounds can be found in [21].
B. Bounds on Detection
The algorithm described allows us to compute an approx-
imate lower bound on the mean square error matrix of the
attacker’s state ζk for a given set of inputs ua0:k, s¯
a
1:k and
observation history y¯1:k. This allows us to obtain a lower
bound on the value of gk(zk) as follows.
Theorem 3: Consider the special case that {Cj} is known
to the adversary for all j ∈ Z. Suppose an attacker attempts
to estimate ζk = {x¯k, ˆ¯xk,Pk} as in attack strategy 2. Let
ˆ¯xek(y¯k) be an estimate of ˆ¯xk as a function of y¯k given y¯1:k−1
and eˆk = ˆ¯xk− ˆ¯xek(y¯k). Suppose a lower bound Z on the error
matrix of ˆ¯xk is obtained so that
Efck
[
eˆkeˆ
T
k
] ≥ Zk. (59)
Then we have
min
y¯ak
Ef∗ [gk(zk)] ≥ tr(CTk P¯−1k CkZk), (60)
where f∗ = f(ˆ¯xk, y¯k|IA∪Pk−1 , uak−1, s¯ak−1, uk−1).
Proof: First, observe from remark 9
f(ζ0:k, y¯k|IA∪Pk−1 , uak−1, s¯ak−1, uk−1) = f ck . (61)
We now have the following.
min
y¯ak
Ef∗ [gk(zk)] (62)
= min
y¯ak
Ef∗
[
tr
(
(y¯ak − Ck ˆ¯xk)(y¯ak − Ck ˆ¯xk)T P¯−1k
)]
,
= min
y¯ak
tr
(
Ef∗
[
(y¯ak − Ck ˆ¯xk)(y¯ak − Ck ˆ¯xk)T P¯−1k
])
,
= tr
(
min
y¯ak
(
Ef∗
[
(y¯ak − Ck ˆ¯xk)(y¯ak − Ck ˆ¯xk)T
]) P¯−1k ) ,
= tr
(
min
ˆ¯xek
(
Ef∗
[
(ˆ¯xek − ˆ¯xk)(ˆ¯xek − ˆ¯xk)T
]) CTk P¯−1k Ck
)
,
= tr
(
min
ˆ¯xek
(
Efck
[
(ˆ¯xek − ˆ¯xk)(ˆ¯xek − ˆ¯xk)T
]) CTk P¯−1k Ck
)
,
≥ tr(CTk P¯−1k CkZk).
The first two equalities follow from properties of the trace
and expectation. The third equality follows from monotonic-
ity properties of the trace function and the fact that P¯−1k is
constant with respect to f∗. The fourth equality is based on
the fact that given Ck, a minimizer lies in the range space
of Ck. The fifth equality is due to (61). The final inequality
follows from (59).
Remark 10: In general, the adversary’s ability to estimate
{ζk} is dependent on the inputs {uak}, {s¯ak}. For instance, the
more the adversary biases the state away from its expected
region of operation, the more challenging it is to perform
estimation. Thus, if the system operator wishes to analyze
how well an adversary can generate stealthy outputs, he must
consider a particular sequence of attack inputs uak, s¯
a
k.
Remark 11: In practice, it may be difficult to perform
performance analysis when assuming Pk is an unknown
state. However, one can still approximate a lower bound on
the error matrix by assuming that the adversary has an oracle
which allows him to know Pk, Kk, I −KkCk.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered attacks on control
systems where an adversary has access to all channels in
a communication network. In order to counter such an
adversary, we propose introducing time-varying dynamics
into the system which are unknown to the adversary and
can in turn be leveraged to detect attacks. Future work will
consider sufficient conditions for the design of these matrices
to prevent zero-dynamic attacks and the analysis of optimal
identification techniques for the adversary.
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